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Introduction
On 2-3 October 2018, the School of Transnational Governance 
of the European University Institute held its first High-
Level Policy Dialogue (HLPD) on China. Co-organised 
with Fudan University’s Fudan Institute of Belt and Road & 
Global Governance, the HLPD brought together academics, 
researchers, policy-makers, former politicians, representatives 
from civil society and the corporate sector from China, Europe 
and the US in order to engage in a discussion on the Belt and 
Road Initiative and how it affects transnational governance and 
the role of Europe. 
The HLPD was organised around four sessions over a two-
day period and the deliberations took place in a constructive 
manner and an open spirit. This policy brief summarises the 
substance and directions of the discussions which took place 
under Chatham House rules, highlighting key takeaways from 
the four sessions.
Policy Brief author: Jens Bastian
Seminar convener: George Papaconstantinou 
The opinions of the authors represent personal opinions and do not represent 
the position or opinion of the European University Institute 
2 ■  STG | Policy Brief | Issue 2018/02 | December 2018
I. The Belt and Road Initiative: Ambitions, 
scope and progress
Officially launched in 2013 by China’s President Xi Jin-
ping in Kazakhstan, the implementation of the Belt and 
Road Initiate (BRI) promises development gains for par-
ticipating countries along the Belt (i.e. land) and Road 
(i.e. maritime) routes of the Initiative. To date, 105 coun-
tries have signed BRI-related cooperation agreements 
along with 29 international organisations (including the 
IMF, the EIB, the World Bank and the EBRD). The BRI 
advocates that it will boost trade volumes, reduce trans-
portation costs (rail and sea freight) while upgrading 
environmental standards and establishing new digital 
connections.
Since its launch, EU governments have made their interest 
in the BRI clear. But many business joint ventures in 
infrastructure projects financed by Chinese policy banks 
illustrate that the BRI is not necessarily a new idea. What 
is new is that many such projects, even if started before 
2013, are being categorised as part of the BRI.
At the same time, the objectives of the BRI are evolving. 
As more countries and international organisations par-
ticipate, the BRI is expanding geographically and adding 
new sectors such as tourism, customs, policing and the 
connectivity of data. This expansion and the process of 
shifting objectives has been interpreted by analysts and 
policy-makers as indicating that China is gradually estab-
lishing policy tools for restructuring global governance.
“ Multilateral institutions cannot provide for all infrastructure needs; China fills a gap, but it cannot do it by 
itself.
”This approach has many advocates in Beijing and 
numerous critics in Washington D.C., Brussels or Tokyo. 
China positions the BRI as an evolving initiative and 
points to the numerous achievements of infrastruc-
ture projects along the BRI. By contrast, its critics tend 
to highlight failing initiatives, growing lending risks by 
individual countries or the lack of transparency in project 
execution. At the same time, the BRI is also being con-
tested to a certain degree in China itself, e.g. through the 
media, NGOs, citizens and private companies.
China is learning from the implementation of projects 
along the BRI, particularly in Africa. It is adjusting stra-
tegic priorities along the route. Such lessons learned con-
cern a greater focus on value for funds invested, applying 
risk management in lending decisions of Chinese policy 
banks and aligning BRI-related projects with countries’ 
own interests and infrastructure needs. Still, this learning 
curve coincides with rising scepticism towards BRI proj-
ects, e.g. in Thailand, Malaysia and Pakistan. Such scep-
ticism often occurs when governments change, and new 
administrations have other strategic infrastructure prior-
ities vis-à-vis China.
II. Infrastructure and finance. The twin 
engines of the BRI
The BRI is primarily financed through loans (not grants) 
provided by Chinese policy banks such as China Devel-
opment Bank (CDB) and Exim Bank as well as special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs) like the Silk Road Fund. While 
the funding architecture for the BRI is evolving, to date 
both the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) play a limited role in 
financing infrastructure projects of the BRI.
As the BRI grows in scale and ambition, the necessary 
financing arrangements become more complex and sub-
ject to international scrutiny. For one, this includes gov-
ernance challenges of BRI projects that are structured as 
Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPS) in emerging markets. 
Furthermore, the funding of capital projects on a scale of 
the BRI has to be taken into account. Subsidised Chinese 
policy banks can provide lending based on soft budget 
constraints, frequent cost overruns and a lack of appro-
priate due diligence as practiced by other international 
financing institutions. Lending practices and targeted 
acquisitions in selected sectors of other countries (e.g. 
artificial intelligence, mechanical engineering, computer 
science) have given rise to demanding enhanced invest-
ment screening regulations prior to closing M&A deals.
Seen from a Chinese perspective, the BRI financing nar-
rative requires the development of new funding rules that 
are not exclusively set by the west. With its accumulated 
foreign reserves and domestic savings levels, China is in 
a position to provide the majority of financial resources 
for the BRI. But Beijing cannot do all the heavy financial 
lifting on its own. It needs other countries and multilat-
eral lenders to join projects.
Quote from a participant
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This financial connectivity agenda implies adherence to 
rules and regulations (e.g. in procurement processes), 
increased transparency requirements, e.g. in what cur-
rency lending and repayment take place and to what 
degree non-performing loans (NPLs) accrue. The BRI 
also brings to the forefront issues related to “financial 
plumbing”, i.e. how private-sector market participants 
(banks, non-banks, custodians etc.) interact with central 
banks and clearing houses for the execution of project 
finance and the coordination of monetary policies across 
the expanding financial footprint of the BRI.
With the BRI, China is not only seeking to build roads, 
bridges and deep-water ports. It is also establishing rep-
utational capital through its investments, lending strat-
egies and M&A activities. This is at risk if the financing 
arrangements are not transparent or lack a level-playing 
field.
III. The BRI and Europe
In September 2018, the European Commission pub-
lished its own connectivity platform (http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-18-5803_en.htm). It sets out the 
Union’s objectives and conditions for increasing connec-
tivity between Europe and Asia, i.e. beyond the focus of 
the BRI. At present, 17 EU member states are members 
of the China-led AIIB. The 16+1 framework established 
by China in Central and Eastern Europe includes 11 EU 
member states.
The blueprint emphasises the harmonisation of regu-
latory standards (e.g. regarding tender procedures and 
governance standards), the sustainability of connec-
tivity (e.g. avoidance of debt traps through concessional 
lending) and the maintenance of a level-playing field. 
However in other policy fields, progress between the EU 
and China is slow; most prominent is the absence of an 
investment agreement and the Commission’s reluctance 
to label China a ‘market economy’.
Sino-EU policy coordination (including Japan) is cur-
rently advancing in a joint complaint at the WTO against 
US tariffs on imported steel and aluminium. But such 
coordination also works in the opposite direction. The 
EU has joined forces with Japan in a WTO suit against 
forced technology transfers in China through mandatory 
joint venture requirements.
Such changing coalition arrangements highlight the 
degree to which the WTO dispute resolution system is 
considered out of date or more generally, underscore 
the increasing fragmentation of international commer-
cial law. Of equal concern for European institutions is 
the observation that arbitration procedures and the legal 
dispute resolution of contracts based on the BRI are now 
located in China and administered according to Chinese 
law. 
While it may appear premature to herald an EU - China 
axis, in some policy areas Brussels and Beijing do find 
themselves on the same side of the argument, most prom-
inently in the defence of the Paris Climate Accord from 
December 2015. Put otherwise, Sino-European coalitions 
are being built as issue-based joint ventures, e.g. in co-fi-
nanced projects in Africa. 
The overriding observation in Sino-European relations 
is characterised by the asymmetry of China’s activities in 
Europe compared to delayed policy responses by Brus-
sels vis-à-vis Beijing. Moreover, on issues that matter to 
China, the EU is increasingly being challenged by some 
of its members who refuse to submit to joint declarations 
on certain issues, making unified European positions 
increasingly difficult to formulate.
IV. The implications of the BRI for the 
transformation of transnational govern-
ance
In contrast to the retreat of the US under President Trump 
from parts of the international stage, China is expanding 
its presence in countries across continents and multilat-
eral institutions, most prominently illustrated by the BRI 
since 2013. Meanwhile, the EU is distracted by the chal-
“In many BRI projects, there is not much transparency on how much are the loans, in what currency, and how much 
has been written down
”
“ Globalisation with Chinese characteristics is a real issue, the EU needs to respect Chinese ambitions to 
make more progress
”
Quote from a participant
Quote from a participant
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lenge of one of its members seeking to leave the bloc and 
thereby implement Brexit.
Political disruptions and economic challenges currently 
shake the global institutional landscape. Together, they 
demand a reassessment of traditional alliances in politics 
and a recalibration of the existing toolbox of crisis man-
agement. With multilateral global governance structures 
under threat from Washington and Brussels to Beijing, 
countries and continents face choices between working 
together or ‘going it alone’.
To what degree former partners can at least be ‘kept in 
the tent’ or new alliances emerge will critically depend 
on how the policy space vacated by others is being used. 
Narrow-minded transactional, opportunistic nation-
alism cannot comprehensibly deal with challenges such 
as climate change, the Iran nuclear agreement or global 
refugee and migration challenges. Both China’s BRI and 
the EU’s Europe – Asia connectivity platform can serve as 
a catalyst for advancing transnational governance struc-
tures. 
This could involve China and Europe working together 
to ensure that Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
are achieved, most importantly regarding environmental 
standards, transparency of regulations and fiscal sustain-
ability. At the same time, as the BRI seeks to foster eco-
nomic and social development in participating countries, 
the possibilities that it can tackle global challenges such 
as extreme poverty through the social and distributional 
impact of its projects need to be explored further. This 
involves identifying levers to alleviate social inequalities 
and including redistributive mechanisms in BRI projects.
At the analytical level, and despite mounting evidence in 
terms of projects commenced or completed, it remains 
unclear to what degree the BRI fits the multilateral or 
transactional model of governance. As a state-sponsored, 
top-down initiative based on bilateral contractual agree-
ments, the latter model seems to apply. Europe’s interest 
in maintaining the liberal rules-based international order 
and applying it to the BRI may not shared by China per 
se, with China seeking to shape the rules of the game itself 
in policy fields such as cyberspace, satellite capacity and 
patent registration.
BRI advocates argue that it serves a larger purpose beyond 
specific investments, enabling other countries to build 
their development paths. However, as BRI expands in 
scope and scale, caution is in order, with concern among 
observers that the BRI is in the process of over-extending 
itself. Thus, the management of expectations is quickly 
becoming the single most important challenge for policy 
makers in Beijing, as the discussion shifts increasingly to 
the role the BRI will play in redefining the rules of trans-
national governance.
“ The BRI is no longer just a collection of individual investments; it is a proxy for something larger ”
Quote from a participant
